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Abstract 
The particularly overheated Chinese housing market, with its soaring property prices, 
has attracted a large amount of research. We point out three of its striking empirical 
features, which current literature leaves unexplored: co-existence of steady growth of real 
transaction price and excess supply, accelerations in price-to-income ratio, and 
significantly strong positive correlation between real transaction prices and income 
inequality. A search-equilibrium model is built to explain these facts. Heterogeneous 
buyers and homogeneous sellers randomly search for partners to trade in a frictional 
property market. The search equilibrium of the property market is either a 
high-price-and-low-transaction elitist matching equilibrium, or a 
low-price-and-high-transaction pooled matching equilibrium. The terms of trade 
determine which equilibrium arises. Empirical observations argue for the development of 
China’s property market through evolution from a pooled matching equilibrium to an 
elitist matching equilibrium. We set out to show that the market equilibrium is always 
inefficient, due to crowding out externalities and market incompleteness. Policy 
experiments support redistributive tax, as a means to improve social welfare. 
 
JEL: C78, D31, R13, R31 
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1  Introduction 
 
In the last two decades there has been a large amount of research on the fast-rising 
property prices in China. The property market in China is now arguably regarded as 
being overheated (Dreger and Zhang 2013, Wu et al. 2012); it is widely accepted that 
speculative investments and accelerating residential demands are the main contributors to 
property market bubbles (Linchetberg and Ding 2009, Zheng and Kahn 2008, Hanink et 
al. 2012). In this paper, we claim that the soaring property prices are an equilibrium 
phenomenon which is a consequence of China’s economic development. Specifically, we 
argue that increases in property prices are the consequences of the evolution of the 
market from a pooled matching equilibrium to an elitist matching equilibrium. Whereas 
in the first equilibrium, transaction prices are lower and volume of trade is higher, in the 
second equilibrium transaction prices are higher but volume of trade is lower. Our 
model’s predictions are consistent with the empirical evidence as documented in Sato 
(2006) and Zhang (2015).
3
 Furthermore, we claim that policies such as direct distributive 
tax could reduce the transaction price and potentially correct market failures caused by 
crowding out externalities and market incompleteness. 
Our theoretical model is motivated by three stylized facts about the Chinese property 
market: first, a steadily increasing property price coexists with excess supplies of 
residential buildings; second, according to the house affordability index (price-to-income 
ratio), property transaction prices are growing at a higher rate than the average income; 
finally, both income and income inequality are strongly positively correlated with 
transaction price. Literature based on a conventional model of residential investment and 
asset pricing, including Bertaut (2002), Case et al. (2005), Muellbauer and Murphy 
(1997), Hongyu et al., (2002), Wang (2011), and Ren et al. (2012) cannot explain the first 
two facts; on the other hand, search-and-bargaining literature like Wheaton (1990), 
Carrillo (2006), and Albrecht et al. (2007, 2016), Genesove and Han (2012) are silent on 
the third factor above. Therefore, building an equilibrium model to investigate the 
Chinese housing market is a contribution to research on housing market in developing 
countries overall, and not just China. 
We built a general equilibrium model within the framework of a random search. 
Ex-ante heterogeneous buyers are differentiated by their disposable wealth, while the 
homogeneous sellers endogenously choose certain types of houses to build, before 
contacting any buyers in the market. Sellers commit to the price they set for trade after 
the investment has been made. Then buyers and sellers randomly search for potential 
partners to trade. Hence, given the distribution of the buyers’ wealth, sellers choose the 
optimal amount of investment in housing, and determine the asking prices in order to 
maximize their expected payoffs through a direct mechanism. 
  Due to market friction, the seller’s optimal strategy trades off a higher profit margin, 
through charging a high price, against a higher probability of trade. We show that there 
exist two market equilibria: in the elitist matching equilibrium, sellers build high-quality 
houses (high investment) and sell these houses only to wealthy buyers at a high price, 
hence excluding less wealthy buyers from the trade; in the pooled matching equilibrium, 
sellers build medium-quality houses (low investment) and sell them to both types of 
                                                          
3 Zhang (2015) had documented the relationships between income inequality and access to housing with Chinese urban 
household survey (UHS) from 2002 to 2009. His findings provided some sound empirical evidences for our theory. 
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buyers at a price also affordable to the less wealthy ones; hence, in the market, every 
contact is consummated into a trade. The first equilibrium arises when either the 
proportion of the wealthy buyers is sufficiently high, or the wealth inequality is 
sufficiently large. The second equilibrium arises when national wealth is relatively 
equally distributed among buyers or there is a relatively low proportion of wealthy buyers. 
We argue that the current development of the Chinese property market could be 
characterized by the elitist matching equilibrium. Furthermore, the model predicts that 
the increase in the income of wealthy households, supported by incessant economic 
growth, will result in even higher property prices in the future. 
Neither of the above market equilibria are efficient. The volume of trade is 
inefficiently low in the elitist matching equilibrium, due to the crowding out externality 
exerted by wealthy buyers on the less wealthy ones. On the other hand, the market is 
incomplete for borrowing and lending. Such market incompleteness causes 
under-investment in properties in the pooled matching equilibrium, but over-investment 
in the elitist matching equilibrium. Through comparative statistical studies, our findings 
sheds light on implications of the policy regulating the housing market in China. Since 
the distribution of wealth across the buyers plays a significant role in determining 
property prices, government policies aimed at curbing property prices need to take into 
consideration the reducing of the wealth inequality between the rich and the poor. 
Previous research, including Wheaton (1990), Carrillo (2006), Genesove and Han 
(2012), Clayton et al. (2010), and Albrecht et al. (2007, 2016), has regarded the housing 
market as a typical market with trade frictions, where searching buyers and sellers coexist. 
These papers mainly concern stock-stock matching, i.e. trading with existing properties. 
Hence, there is a trade-off between time to trade and transaction price. However, inflows 
of newly completed constructions account for a large proportion of existing housing stock 
(according to Zheng and Kahn 2008, this ratio was as high as 13.1% in 2005) and the 
price determination in an equilibrium stock-flow matching model remains to be solved. 
In our work, the equilibrium transaction price is determined by the distribution of types 
of buyers, and the evolvement of price is associated with the development of the 
reallocation of wealth among buyers. Furthermore, we allow the quality of the housing to 
be endogenously determined, thus differing from the above search models, which assume 
ex-ante homogenous, but ex-post heterogeneous matching specific house qualities. 
Consequently, our model implies the positive sorting in elitist matching equilibrium, 
which is analogous to search-and-matching models of labour market like Acemoglu 
(1999) and Albrecht et al. (2007, 2016). 
The remainder of this paper is organized into six sections; Section Two briefly 
discusses the recent findings in the Chinese housing market, which motivate our study; 
Section Three presents the model and derives market equilibria; Section Four shows a 
social welfare study; Section Five describes the policy experiment study and the policy 
implications; Section Six concludes and discusses potential future research. 
 
2  Stylized Facts about the Chinese Property Market 
 
This section illustrates three striking features of the Chinese property market. We 
use annual market data ranging between 1991 and 2011, from the China Economic 
Information Network Statistical Database.
 
This data includes information on the supply 
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side of the market, for example annually completed new residential buildings (measured 
in square metres), and the demand side of the market, such as the annual average 
transaction price, annual transaction quantity (measured in square metres), and household 
income. We also use the rates of inflation and interest during the same period, published 
by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. All prices and incomes have been deflated, 
by taking 1999 as the reference base year. 
 
Fact 1. Constant increases in transaction price coexist with excess 
supply.
4
 
 
 
Figure 1. Transaction price and excess supply. 
 
The upper panel in Figure 1 demonstrates the relationship between the net supply 
and the real transaction price (taking 1999 as the base year) from 1991 to 2011 in China, 
and the lower panel shows the relationship between the growth rates of inflows of supply 
and real transaction prices from the same period. From the upper panel, over the last two 
decades, a steady increase in real property transaction prices can be observed at a time 
when the Chinese property market was experiencing excess supplies. As is shown, the 
real transaction price has been increasing since 1991, except for two slight drops in 1994 
and in 2008. Meanwhile, the net inflow of stock, or excess supply, measured in square 
metres of completed constructions minus square metres of transacted constructions in the 
same period, rose until 1999 and has been declining since then. However, the net supply 
                                                          
4
 "Excess supply" is calculated by subtracting the square metres of transacted residential buildings from the 
square metres of the currently completed residential buildings. A positive value of the series implies that 
the current supply of new buildings is greater than demand; otherwise, the net inflow of stock is negative. 
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of newly constructed square metres was always positive, except from 2009 to 2011. In 
other words, over the 20 years of the sample period, in the Chinese property market, 
excess supplies coexisted with steady increases in real transaction prices. Essentially, it 
implies that the price mechanism failed to clear out supply and demand in the market. On 
the other hand, the lower panel of Figure 1 shows that the growth rate of square metres of 
completed residential buildings has increased with the growth rate of transaction prices. It 
turns out that a higher transaction price drives up the inflows of completed square metres, 
i.e. a positive supply relationship to the market. This reinforces the argument we claimed 
regarding the upper portion of Figure 1. Although one needs to read these graphs with 
caution,
5
 our data argues for the theory that explains the coexistence of excess supply 
and soaring property prices, over the last two decades. 
 
Fact 2. The property transaction price grows at a higher rate than 
the average income.  
 
 
Figure 2. Growth of per capita income and price-to-income ratio. 
 
Though the steady growth in per capita income may drive property prices up, 
balanced growth implies that on the equilibrium path, per capita income
6
, per capita 
residential square metres, and transaction prices should grow at the same rate, i.e. the 
                                                          
5
 The effect of stock-flow, i.e. trade of stock vs. trade of inflows, may also contribute to the property price 
adjustment during the same period, if one had detailed empirical data. However, it is reasonable to argue 
that the stock-flow effects are relatively weak, because we have observed a mostly positive net inflow of 
supply over the sample period. 
6 Per capita income is measured as the urban per capita annual disposable income. 
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price-to-income ratio is a constant.
7
 However, we found that for the last two decades the 
transaction price has been growing much faster than the average income. As it is shown 
in Figure 2, a steady increase in the average real household income is matched by a 
soaring price-to-income ratio. Compared to a constant growth in real income, this 
increase in price-to-income ratio is rather discrete and sharp. Specifically, this ratio 
sharply increased from 6.6 in 2003 to 7.9 in 2005, and saw a jump from 7.2 in 2008 to 8.5 
in 2009. Such trends are stronger in more economically developed areas, like Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangdong. The ratios of these locations were generally higher than the 
national average.
8
 For instance, it took nearly 20 years for a household with an average 
income to purchase an average sized apartment in Beijing in the year 2010. These 
findings argue for the consideration of other factors, besides income growth, to explain 
increases in transaction prices. 
 
Table 1. Regional Price-to-Income Ratios 
 
Fact 3. Both income and income inequality are strongly positively 
correlated with transaction price. 
 
Further investigations into the relationship between property prices and household 
income are captured in the correlation matrix of Table 2. We use the 90:10 ratio to 
measure income inequality.
9
 Table 2 shows that the real transaction prices have a 
significant and strong correlation with average income and income inequality. As 
predicted, a higher income drives up the demand, hence a higher transaction price. 
However, there is a surprisingly positive correlation between income inequality and 
property prices (0.90) and it is almost as strong as the correlation between income and 
price (0.97). As we argued in the introduction, current theories give satisfactory 
explanations regarding the correlation between income and price, and between income 
and inequality, but leave the correlation between price and inequality unexplored. This 
paper devotes a theory to explain this fact through sorting and matching. Note that the 
negative correlation between price and net inflows does not contradict the claim of fact 1; 
but rather, it portrays the demand function of the property market. 
These stylized facts imply that to investigate the Chinese property market, the 
                                                          
7
 "Price-to-income ratio" is calculated with the following formula:  
                                                 
                 
  
8
 Due to the lack of some provincial data, we can only calculate the regional price-to-income ratios from 
1999 to 2011. 
9
 One can also use the Gini coefficient as an indicator of inequality. We are unable to find the Gini 
coefficient after 2004. However, based on the limited data set, we have found that the Gini coefficient 
shows a similar trend as when we use the 90:10 ratio. 
 2001 2004 2005 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Beijing 9.1 8.1 10.0 11.2 15.0 16.2 19.3 16.7 
Shanghai 6.3 8.8 9.6 9.4 9.1 13.9 14.4 13.1 
Guangdong 6.6 6.4 7.9 8.2 9.0 9.4 9.9 9.6 
Source: Authors’ calculation. Units: year. 
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competitive models fail to capture essential facts to match the above empirical 
observations. Due to market frictions, supply-and-demand analyses based on a 
competitive market are unable to explain these stylized facts, and hence are misleading. 
In the following section, we build a search-and-matching model to characterize recent 
developments in our target property market. 
 
                                                  
     1.00       
      0.90* 1.00      
        -0.24 -0.22 1.00     
         -0.46 -0.48 0.12 1.00    
     0.16 0.43 0.01 -0.49* 1.00   
         0.93* 0.97* -0.32 -0.51* 0.32 1.00  
       -0.54 -0.46* -0.17 0.01 0.32 -0.52* 1.00 
Note:      stands for inequality,       for transaction price,         for growth rate 
of price,          for growth rate of supply of new housing,      for real interest 
rate,          for average income, and        for the net inflow of housing. Values 
wih   are significant at 95% level. 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 
 
3  The Model 
3.1  Model setting 
 
In this section we consider a simple one-shot game in a property market. There are 
two types of agents: ex-ante homogeneous sellers and ex-ante heterogeneous buyers. The 
measure of buyers is fixed at a unit mass and that of sellers is    . Proportion   of the 
buyers are the  -type buyers, i.e. with an endowment of wealth   , and proportion 
      are the  -type buyers, i.e. with an endowment   .10 We assume that         
Although the distribution of buyers’ wealth is common knowledge, the type of a 
particular buyer is private information, hence non-observable. 
The market is frictional. The buyers and sellers contact each other through random 
searches. The aggregate number of contacts is determined by the number of sellers and 
buyers, specifically through a constant-return-to-scale matching function,       . 
Following the standard argument, on average a buyer will contact a seller following a 
Poisson process at a rate       where   is the seller-to-buyer ratio, i.e. the market 
tightness. Similarly, the contacting rate for a seller, denoted by       is just      
      . We also assume that   and   map the positive real numbers       onto 
themselves; note that      and       so             and           
 . In other words, if there are very few buyers per seller, buyers could find a seller 
                                                          
10 Although, we assumed two-point distribution for simplicity, our theory prevails with any general case in which 
distribution of buyers’ types are discrete. If the distribution of the types of buyers is continuous, there will be 
continuum equilibria of the market, and the submarket for each type of buyers is infinitely divisible. Empirically, it is 
less appealing and not relevant to our theory. 
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instantly but it takes an extremely long time for a seller to contact a buyer; the opposite is 
true if there are many buyers for each seller. 
Despite the difference of wealth endowment, buyers obtain payoffs from strictly 
concave preferences on housing, i.e.       such that                 and 
        with the standard INADA conditions         and        , where   
denotes the quality of a house endogenously determined by the sellers. Furthermore, we 
assume that buyers also obtain linear utility directly from their wealth as there are no 
diminishing returns to marginal utility of wealth. This implies that the buyers’ preference 
is quasiconcave, defined through the quality of the house as well as his or her wealth.
11
 
Risk neutral sellers enter the market, and each develops a unit of house by making 
an irreversible investment   in the quality of the house before contacting a potential 
buyer.
12
 Since the investment   is made, the set up of the property is completed 
immediately as one unit of indivisible goods for trade,
13
 and profit maximizing sellers 
determine an asking price for the house they possess. The price  , is a take-it or leave-it 
offer, under which the seller is committed to trade with the buyers. Due to the 
asymmetric information, sellers cannot price discriminate buyers based on    and   . 
Hence, the price is type independent, in the sense that both the  -type buyers and the 
 -type buyers are charged the same asking price.14 After contacting a seller, the quality 
of the house   is observed, and the buyer decides whether to trade, following individual 
rationality. In this one-shot game, contact is consummated into a transaction of a house 
from seller to buyer (match of a buyer and a seller) upon a mutual agreement, so the 
game ends. Otherwise, either party could refuse to trade and the game ends. Unmatched 
buyers obtain utility from endowment of wealth, whereas unmatched sellers with leftover 
properties withdraw from the market and obtain zero payoff.
15
 
 
3.2  Search Equilibrium of the Property Market 
 
In this part, first we define the search equilibrium of the market; then we show the 
existence of market equilibria followed by characterizations. Finally, we show which 
specific equilibrium arises depending on the terms of trade. 
After contacting a seller, the buyer observes the type of house   and the asking 
price  . Given a contact, let          denote the probability that a buyer agrees to 
trade. Accordingly, the buyer could either choose to accept the house offer        i.e. 
    , or to reject it, i.e.       For simplicity, mixed strategy equilibria are not 
considered here (though they often exist). Let    denote the value function of an 
 -type buyer, hence the buyer chooses    to maximize the expected payoff      
                                                          
11
 A specific functional form of the utility function of the buyers will be given below. 
12
 Sellers and developers are interchangeable in this model, though, in general, it is not necessarily the case 
that sellers and developers share the same interests. 
13
 We admit that the assumption that the setup of a property is completed immediately may change the 
implications in a multi-shot dynamic model, in which case stock-flow effects play an important role in 
deciding investment and price. 
14
 Another method of modelling the slipping rule in search literature is bargaining. However, as it is 
difficult to observe wealth of buyers due to asymmetric information, the issue of adverse selection may 
arise. In fact, the price a house is traded at is very close to the asking price that the agent sets. 
15
 Withdrawal of unmatched properties is assumed to render market equilibrium consistent with the static 
framework. In a multi-shot dynamic setup, free entries ensure that the market is cleared out in equilibrium. 
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                                            (1)  
            
At a rate  , an  -type buyer meets a seller with a house of type   and an asking price 
   As the buyer also obtains linear utility from their endowed wealth, the buyer enjoys 
   if she fails to contact a seller, occurring at a rate of    , or if the buyer contacts a 
seller, but refuses to trade, with a probability of        . If the buyer agrees to trade, 
i.e.       then they obtain payoff      by paying the price   that is no higher than 
the level of their wealth endowment. The probability that the  -type buyer is met with a 
seller and chooses to trade is      otherwise the buyer just enjoys the linear utility from 
their wealth     as equation (1) shows. Individual rationality implies that      iff 
      . Therefore,    is consistent with the willingness to pay of the  -type buyer 
to pay for a house of a certain quality. Note that in equation (1),    is the reservation 
value which marks the lower boundary of the buyer’s utility. Similarly, the value of an 
 -type buyer is: 
                    
  
                                     (2) 
            
On the other hand, given the value of   , sellers make decisions on ex-ante investment   
and price  , to maximize the expected payoff   , which is defined below: 
       
   
                                         (3) 
                              
                        
The ex-ante investment decision of the seller is made before contacting any buyer. Then 
the seller sets the price and contacts a buyer at a rate  . The buyer encountered is an 
 -type with a probability   and    is her choice of trading, so trade occurs and the 
seller obtains a revenue   with a probability     . Similarly, with a probability 
        , the seller trades with an  -type buyer and obtains revenue  . It is intuitive 
to see that the transaction price   cannot be higher than the endowed wealth level of the 
buyer   . At the same time, to conduct a successful trade, the seller has to invest in  , 
that is consistent with the buyer’s optimal choice       The utility that buyers obtain 
from purchasing a house      is not lower than the direct linear utility from transferred 
wealth  , which is paid to the seller. Hence, the price announced by the seller influences 
the transaction probability    as well as her revenue per transaction.16 
In a market equilibrium, sellers maximize their expected profit and buyers maximize 
their expected utility. The search equilibrium of the housing market can be characterized 
recursively with those value functions: 
 
Definition 1 A search equilibrium of the housing market is a set             such 
that      solve the seller’s problem in (3) and       solve the buyer’s problem in (1) 
and (2) respectively.  
 
Definition 1 implies that given the space of trade, in any equilibrium, the seller’s 
                                                          
16
 For a study on housing market with directed search equilibrium, please see Albrecht et al. (2009). 
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investment   and listing price   must be consistent with the buyers’ choice of   ; on 
the other hand, buyer’s choice of    must be the best response to seller’s offer      , 
hence they are consistent with the equilibrium. Based on the choice of   , there are    
potential pure-strategy Nash equilibria. However, it is not necessary to analyze all four 
candidate outcomes; the following proposition shows that only two pure-strategy Nash 
equilibria exist in this market.
17
 
 
Proposition 1 The equilibrium in the housing market is either a pooled matching 
equilibrium               or an elitist matching equilibrium             .  
 
Proof. Depending on the choice of     the four possible outcomes of equilibria are 
                            and            Obviously, 
          is a Nash equilibrium, as sellers invest nothing and buyers are not going to 
make any transactions with sellers, and the market shuts down. Not trading is also 
consistent with a Nash equilibrium, i.e. a degenerate search equilibrium. For the rest of 
the three candidate cases, in which the market is active, we solve for   and   for a 
given set of   . To justify an equilibrium, we then show that given the   and   
solution,    is the optimal response. 
We start with the case of          In a pooled matching equilibrium, both 
types of buyers are willing to trade with sellers. Following equation (3) a price-setting 
seller’s problem can be written as:  
             
   
                                (4) 
                      
           
             
For any given level of investment  , if the seller sets her price such that         by 
increasing the price she could increase her profits from trade. On the other hand, due to 
market friction, further increases in   do not necessarily lead to a decrease in the 
volume of trade. Random search implies the existence of local monopoly powers among 
sellers, which alleviate price competition between them. Hence, the pricing strategy 
       is dominated by the strategy         The pricing strategy        will 
be such that no buyer wants to trade with the seller, which contradicts          
Hence, the optimal price for the seller is         such that the utility constraint (UC) 
is binding  Recalling the assumption        then the budget constraint (BCH) is 
automatically satisfied if (BCL) holds. The seller’s value function (4) can be rewritten as:  
      
 
                                 (5) 
                        
Therefore, for any given form of concave function    we can solve for an optimal 
investment     so that the optimal price is           
     18  Hence, the 
pooled matching equilibrium              exists. 
To prove that the elitist matching equilibrium           exists, similar 
                                                          
17
 We are only interested in the pure-strategy equilibrium in this model, since the mixed-strategy 
equilibrium is less empirically appealing and adds little in the way of new insights. 
18
 The optimal solution could either be a corner solution or an interior solution; we will provide more 
details on this in the following Lemma 1. 
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arguments apply. In an elitist matching equilibrium, only  -type buyers are willing to 
trade, hence the seller’s problem is: 
      
   
                                (6) 
                      
           
             
For similar principles as in the pooled matching equilibrium, the seller has the local 
monopoly power. The seller will collect all the consumer surplus, so utility constraint 
(UC) must bind at the optimum, i.e.         Combining the budget constraints (BCL) 
and (BCH), the seller’s problem (6) can be rewritten as:  
      
 
                                 (7) 
                        
                    
Therefore, for any given form of concave function    we can solve for an optimal 
investment     so that the optimal price is            
       Hence, the pooled 
matching equilibrium              exists. 
Finally,           cannot be an equilibrium. As       it implies that 
         , whilst the utility constraint and the budget constraint for the  -type 
buyers are both satisfied. However, given the same preference,      if, and only if, 
the price is beyond the budget constraint of the  -type buyers, so that       Hence 
     , which is a contradiction. The equilibrium in which only  –type buyers are 
served does not exist. ■   
 
Given the existence of the search equilibria, we can further study the properties of 
price and volume of transactions in both equilibria. There are several interesting aspects 
of these equilibrium results which are worth emphasizing. 
 
Lemma 1 Assuming that market frictions are sufficiently low, specifically when 
          
  , sellers set a house price     
  and an investment   
  such that 
    
      in the pooled matching equilibrium; and a higher price     
  and a 
higher investment   
 , such that     
      in the elitist matching equilibrium. 
However, the volume of trade in the elitist matching equilibrium,     is lower than the 
one in the pooled matching equilibrium,     
 
Proof. (First Part) To analyze the pooled matching equilibrium, let us recall the 
seller’s value function (5); the Kuhn-Tucker Lagrangian problem can be written as: 
                       
The first order conditions are: 
                                                          (8) 
                                  
Any active seller will choose an investment      so that                
          If the budget constraint (BCL) binds, i.e.            then the optimal 
investment in   is tied down by a corner solution   
           whereas     
which requires that 
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                             (9) 
On the other hand, if (BCL) does not bind, the optimal solution is determined by the first 
order condition (8) by substituting      hence the outcome is an interior solution   , 
such that             
The proof of the elitist matching equilibrium is similar to that of the pooled 
matching equilibrium, so we have reserved the second part for the Appendix. ■ 
  
The intuition behind this result can be explained as follows: to build a better house 
by increasing  , sellers increase buyers’ utility from house consumption. Hence, sellers 
can request a higher asking price from those buyers who are willing to trade. Note that in 
the necessary condition (9), as (UC) constraint binds,        captures a seller’s 
marginal revenue from an increasing  , whereas     measures this seller’s marginal 
cost. In the case of large values of  , the marginal cost of investment in   is lower than 
marginal revenue, so that it is profitable to invest more and charge a higher price up until 
(BCL) binds. However, if   is relatively low, the marginal revenue is lower than the 
marginal cost of investment. Therefore it is not optimal for a seller to charge    and 
invest up to   
   as in Figure 3, where the standard tangent condition holds for optimality. 
However, in either case, the choices of   and   are consistent with the pooled 
matching equilibrium, i.e.         19 
In fact, those interior solutions are not consistent with the matching equilibria of 
Proposition 1. As the buyers’ optimal choices are not constrained by their wealth, 
equilibrium investment and prices are always in the buyers’ budget set. The  -type and 
 -type buyers are perfectly substitutable, hence the elitist matching equilibrium does not 
exist.
20
  
                                                          
19 To sum up, the house investment and asking price in a pooled matching equilibrium should be either an 
interior solution         such that        
 
 
          if        
  or a corner solution    
      
such that   
               
      
   if           
       as described in Figure 3. 
20
 As shown in Figure 3, in a market with high matching friction, i.e.           
          
   fails, 
investment and price are not consistent with the elitist matching equilibrium. Specifically, as these tangent 
conditions imply      , in the elitist matching equilibrium both investment and transaction prices are 
lower than those of the pooled matching equilibrium. Given the same preference,  -type buyers are willing 
to trade in a market with a higher transaction price but not in a market with a lower price, as the  -type 
buyers did. This contradicts individual rationality. 
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Figure 3. Corner solutions of investment in the pooled and elitist matching equilibria:   
  and   
 , and 
interior solutions in the pooled and elitist matching equilibria:    and      
 
Consider the case where market frictions are sufficiently low and the results of two 
equilibria are both corner solutions. Following Lemma 1, the budget constraint (BCL) 
binds in the pooled matching equilibrium, i.e.     
   and the budget constraint (BCH) 
binds in the elitist matching equilibrium, i.e.     
   As the seller’s marginal revenue 
from building an affordable house is always higher than the marginal cost,      
       
and     
         the investment choices are tied down by   
          and 
  
         , as summarized in Lemma 1. By facing the housing offer    
     , buyers 
are willing to spend all their wealth to obtain such a property.
21
 We are only interested in 
the case where market frictions are sufficiently low (i.e.           
          
     
hence at least one of two buyer’s budget constraints binds and the wealth inequality 
matters.
22
 
Given that two search equilibria exist, sellers will pick the one which generates the 
higher expected profit. In the pooled matching equilibrium, the buyers’ choices are 
           , and the value functions of two types of buyers are respectively:  
  
        
        
   
  
        
        
   
where the equilibrium price chosen by sellers is        
       Following Lemma 1, 
the value function of a seller in the pooled matching equilibrium is:  
                 
     
                               (10) 
In the elitist matching equilibrium, the buyers’ choices are              
and the value function of the  -type buyers is just    since they choose not to buy a 
                                                          
21
 In fact, this result is consistent with the observations in the Chinese housing market. As an example, 
Pugh (2009) indicates that many parents in China spend all their wealth, and even borrow from relatives 
and friends, in order to purchase a house for the marriage of their children. 
22
 We need to point out that the equilibrium prices set at    and    respectively are not the result of the 
one-period game setting in the model, but a result of the searching between buyers and sellers. This finding 
is consistent with the Diamond’s (1971) dilemma, which states that when sellers have full bargaining 
power, market friction does not distort the incentives for them to charge the monopoly price. 
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house. The value function of the  -type buyers is:  
  
       
        
   
where the optimal pricing choice of the  -type sellers is        
       The value 
function of sellers when they choose to exclusively serve  -type buyers is:  
  
     
          (11) 
From equations (10) and (11), the sellers’ profits increase with the buyers’ wealth. 
This implies that there is an indifference condition for sellers between investing   
  in 
the elitist matching equilibrium and investing   
  in the pooled matching equilibrium. 
Sellers will choose the elitist matching equilibrium if, and only if   
    
 . Specifically, 
by equating (10) and (11):  
  
    
             
Let    denote the threshold level of wealth of an  -type buyer, which renders sellers 
indifferent between two equilibria, that is:  
                 
  
    
 
  
 
  
 
                         (12) 
Sellers choose the elitist matching equilibrium if, and only if, the  -type buyers’ 
wealth level is higher than the threshold level of wealth   . Otherwise, choosing the 
pooled matching equilibrium is strictly better for the sellers. By equation (12), we can 
replace the condition   
    
  by        The following proposition states the 
existence and uniqueness of     
 
Proposition 2 For any given  ,   and   , there exists a unique threshold level 
of wealth     at which sellers are indifferent between the elitist matching equilibrium 
and the pooled matching equilibrium. The sellers choose the elitist matching equilibrium 
in the decentralized market if, and only if        Furthermore, this threshold level of 
wealth    is decreasing in   and increasing in       
 Proof. See Appendix. ■   
 
The intuition of the proposition can be explained in the following way: by 
choosing the elitist matching equilibrium rather than the pooled matching equilibrium, 
sellers trade off the rate of matching for a higher profit margin. By choosing   
   the 
matching rate for a seller is lower as the transaction price    is so high that the less 
wealthy buyers will be excluded from the trade. Hence, sellers have fewer chances to sell 
the property.    is the threshold level of wealth of the  -type buyers which makes the 
sellers’ expected profits indifferent between two equilibria. If the  -type buyers’ wealth 
is above   , then the sellers are better off in the elitist matching equilibrium than in the 
pooled matching equilibrium. For a given  , if        the expected profit is higher in 
the elitist matching equilibrium, as increases in the profit margin are sufficiently high to 
cover reductions in the matching rate. In addition, as this threshold    is decreasing in 
 , the larger the proportion of the  -type buyers, the higher the chance a seller could 
meet an  -type buyer to trade, hence, the higher expected profit for the sellers to achieve 
in the elitist matching equilibrium. The threshold    is increasing in    because, as the 
wealth of the  -type buyers increases, sellers are more likely to choose to serve both 
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types of buyer, so that they can collect more revenue in a pooled matching equilibrium, 
where every contact is consummated into a trade. It requires a high    to maintain the 
profit margin such that the elitist matching equilibrium is more profitable than the pooled 
matching equilibrium. 
If we apply the specific form of utility function             then    can be 
given explicitly as                         . For any given  ,   and 
    an elitist matching equilibrium arises if and only if        otherwise a pooled 
matching equilibrium does. This is illustrated clearly in Figure 4.
23
 The solid line is the 
threshold level of   , above which is the combination of parameters causing the elitist 
matching equilibrium to render the sellers better off. However the area below shows 
where the sellers are better off in the pooled matching equilibrium. With a higher    
ceteris paribus, the threshold    is driven down. This is reflected by the dashed line in 
the graph. Furthermore, if the distribution of individual wealth becomes more 
imbalanced, either because of a lower   , causing in turn a lower   , or because of a 
higher   , the condition is more likely to be satisfied, hence an elitist matching 
equilibrium arises.  
   
Figure 4.  Threshold level of type-H buyers’ wealth    as a function of the type-L buyers’ wealth, 
    and the proportion of type-H buyers,    
 
The immediate implication of the model’s result is that, for a given growth rate of 
aggregate income, when the wealth gap between the rich and the poor broadens, it is 
more likely that the housing market ends up in the elitist matching equilibrium. The 
soaring prices in the Chinese property market are a consequence of a transition from 
pooled matching equilibrium to elitist matching equilibrium. 
Rapid growth in China transmits wealth to individuals, thus enlarging the wealthy 
                                                          
23
 In this particular numerical example, we chose       , which represents the average duration of the 
sale of a house as          months. The proportion of  -type buyers is          . Hence,  -type 
buyers are always in the majority. Then we created the state space based on    with a value between   
and     , in a range which guarantees    has a real root, at a step of     . 
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class. Our model insists upon that inequality as a fundamental factor in explaining sharp 
increases in property price. Theories argue that a steady growth in income, hence a higher 
demand, are the driving forces behind the prediction of a relatively stable price-to-income 
ratio for property prices. However, this prediction is inconsistent with stylized fact 2 we 
have shown previously. As one can see from Figure 2, spikes during 1995-1997, 
2003-2005, and 2008-2010 imply a faster growth rate of property prices. Considering big 
cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, property prices have been mounting much 
faster than income. Furthermore, periods characterized by increases in price-to-income 
ratio are also accompanied by increases in Villa-to-afforable-house ratio. Specifically, 
this ratio increased from 0.36 to 0.88 during 2002-2005, and from 0.79 to 1.53 from 
2008-2010.
24
 This data shows that the Chinese property market has evolved from a 
pooled matching equilibrium to an elitist matching equilibrium, thus there are more 
luxury houses/villas than economic/affordable houses. Consequently, soaring property 
prices are observed. 
 
4  Welfare Consequences 
 
The preceding section characterizes the search equilibria of property markets with a 
welfare study of the decentralized market. 
A benevolent social planner maximizes the social welfare by increasing the sum of 
the values of agents, based on an utilitarian welfare function. Specifically, the social 
planner decides to invest   to maximize social welfare, subject to the matching 
constraints. The planner’s problem can be written as follows: 
      
 
                 
                                              
                                              (13) 
                            (RC) 
Since the price   is a pure transfer from buyers to sellers, it becomes irrelevant in the 
target function (RC). The planner is concerned with the trade-off between utility gains 
from relocating wealth to investing in housing, and its opportunity cost of forgoing 
payoffs. The planner chooses social optimal investment level   for sellers in the 
property market, and then assigns these completed properties to the buyers, subject to 
matching constraint (RC). The planner also transfers wealth from buyers to sellers to 
finance these investments. During this process, the ex-ante investment   cannot exceed 
the total endowment of wealth disposable for transfer. This characterizes the resource 
constraint for a social planner.
25
 
If the social marginal benefit from investment is higher than the social marginal cost 
of  , the planner chooses to reallocate more wealth to house investment; otherwise, she 
will reduce investment   in order to improve social welfare. Since the INADA condition 
implies that one of the corner solutions where     cannot be an optimum, the 
constrained efficiency indicates that it is either an inner solution, where the social 
                                                          
24
 We only have data on annually completed “villas and luxury houses” and “economic and affordable 
houses” from 1997. The data is from China Internet Economic Data Base and is measured in ten-thousand 
square meters. 
25
 Borrowing and lending are not allowed in this model. 
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marginal benefit equals the social marginal cost, or the other corner solution, where the 
planner invests all the possible disposable wealth. We summarize the features related to 
welfare consequences in the following proposition: 
Proposition 3 The social optimum (constrained efficiency) is such that any contact 
is consummated into a trade, i.e.        ; the optimal investment level is the 
average wealth, i.e.    
             .  
Proof. See Appendix. ■    
 
The INADA condition implies that a closed market cannot be the social optimum. 
At zero investment, a social marginal gain from investments in houses is infinite. On the 
other hand, the social marginal cost is the foregone utilities  obtained from the wealth, 
discounted by market frictions (market friction implies leakages from transfers of wealth 
from buyers to sellers; some of the wealth, which generates direct utilities, is allocated to 
house investment but may not be consumed). If market friction is low, the social marginal 
gains from investment are above the social marginal cost. Hence, the resource constraint 
binds, while buyers should always trade. 
Furthermore, although the planner is utilitarian, the sum of quasiconcave utility 
functions of buyers implies that the more equally the aggregate wealth is distributed, the 
better off is the whole of society. Therefore, the social optimum is such that the aggregate 
wealth should be equally invested in houses for all the buyers in the economy. 
The implication of the social optimality is that market equilibrium cannot be 
efficient. Specifically, the following proposition summarizes our argument: 
 
Proposition 4 The decentralized market is inefficient. When the elitist matching 
equilibrium occurs, there are over-investments in houses and a low transaction volume. 
When the pooled matching equilibrium occurs or takes place, there is an efficient volume 
of transaction, albeit with under-investment in the housing market.  
 
The investment in the pooled matching equilibrium is inefficiently low. To see that, 
suppose that the seller invests in the social optimal investment    
   Recall Lemma 1 
showing that the price charged by a seller cannot be above     where       
   this 
implies that this seller will make a loss. Hence, the house investment in the pooled 
matching equilibrium in the decentralized market must be lower than    
 . 
On the other hand, the elitist matching equilibrium in the decentralized market 
incurs an inefficiently high investment. Assuming that the seller chooses to invest     
where       
   then the asking price is        
          given the fact that the 
 -type buyer’s budget constraint binds, where the marginal revenue of investment is 
above the marginal cost of investment. This implies that choosing   above    
  can be 
more profitable to a seller, which will lead to over-investment. 
The elitist matching equilibrium is inefficient due to the crowding out externality 
exerted by  -type buyers on  -type buyers. The decentralized market converges to the 
elitist matching equilibrium if there is a sufficiently high proportion of potential  -type 
buyers who possess more wealth than  -type buyers. To extract these surpluses from 
trade, sellers need to increase investment    which in turn drives up the 
willingness-to-pay of  -type buyers. As in Lemma 1, sellers will invest in   up to the 
(UC) constraint. Under this condition, the transaction price will be   , which is above 
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the budget set to the  -type buyers, for those who are excluded from the market. The 
crowding out externality entails that the volume of trade is inefficiently low, whereby 
these  -type buyers who are willing to trade are excluded. 
Though the volume of trade is efficient in the pooled matching equilibrium, the 
investment   is inefficiently low. It is worth pointing out that the under-investment in a 
pooled matching equilibrium is not due to the typical hold-up problem of ex-ante 
investment. Instead, it is a result of the incomplete market for borrowing and lending. To 
understand this, consider an alternative where sellers invest after contacting a potential 
buyer. In this case, buyers will truthfully review their willingness to pay, given the (UC) 
constraint is satisfied. Hence,  -type buyers will get better housing than  -type buyers 
and there is no hold-up problem. When compared with the planner’s solution, social 
welfare could be improved, whereas  -type buyers could borrow from  -type buyers to 
make sellers invest more than   . Although  -type buyers obtain less utility from trade 
with sellers,  -type buyers are better off through borrowing. Due to the concavity of  , 
the social marginal welfare gains are higher than the social marginal welfare losses. 
However, if there was a market and a rate of returns on borrowing and lending,  -type 
buyers could borrow from  -type ones. This could relax the wealth constraint of  -type 
buyers, and hence increase investment in the pooled matching equilibrium, along with 
social welfare. Furthermore, the market friction and ex-ante investment exaggerate this 
problem by lowering   even further.26  The inefficient results of the decentralized 
market indicate that a housing market with search friction, along with unequal 
distribution of individual wealth, cannot reach the social optimum. This may establish the 
need for government intervention. In the next section, we will investigate the impacts of 
hypothetical government policies on the equilibrium investment and prices in the housing 
market. 
 
5  Policy Experiments 
 
The decentralized market is inefficient, due to crowding out externalities and the 
lack of market for borrowing and lending. Findings in the previous section argue for 
policy intervention: we begin with a direct tax (e.g. redistributive taxation), then an 
indirect tax which is based on the volume of transaction, and the property tax. 
 
5.1  Redistributive Tax 
 
Suppose that the government observes the wealth of buyers and uses lump-sum 
transfers from  -type buyers to  -type buyers. A benevolent government redistributes 
wealth from the rich to the poor, due to inequality aversion.
27
 Specifically, we assume 
that the government imposes a lump-sum tax   on the  -type buyers, and transfers   
to the  -type buyers. We also assume that           ; the  -type buyers are still 
richer than the  -type buyers after such a tax. The balanced budget implies that:28 
                                                          
26
 A similar principle explains the over-investment in the elitist matching equilibrium. 
27
 Instead of formally modelling the welfare function of the government, we only consider the static 
analysis of the policy. 
28
 In this one period game, we assume that the government is always in fiscal balance. 
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Under such a policy, the buyer’s problem becomes: 
       
  
                        
  
                     (14) 
                 
The seller’s value function has a similar structure as it did in the previous section, but 
with a new budget constraint on buyers. Following procedures similar to those used in 
previous sections to solve for the equilibrium under the tax schedule, the effects of the 
direct tax on the decentralized market is summarized by the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5 A direct redistributive taxation decreases the transaction price    
and the investment level    in the elitist matching equilibrium, but increases the 
transaction price    and the investment level    in the pooled equilibrium. 
Furthermore, the threshold    goes up under this tax policy.  
Proof. See Appendix. ■    
 
When the government imposes a lump-sum redistributive tax on the  -type buyers, 
the  -type buyers face a more rigid budget constraint. As previously discussed, sellers 
will charge the monopoly price in the search equilibrium, and a tighter budget constraint 
will decrease the monopoly price charged in the elitist equilibrium. On the contrary, a 
subsidy to buyers will relax the  -type buyers’ budget constraint, thus offering sellers a 
chance to charge a higher price to  -type buyers. As long as  -type buyers have a 
higher budget constraint than  -type ones, there exist two search equilibria under direct 
tax. 
Accordingly, with a lower price in the elitist matching equilibrium, sellers invest 
less than when there is no direct redistributive tax, as the investment up to   
  will lead 
to them incurring a loss. However in the pooled matching equilibrium, as the equilibrium 
price is higher than when there is no direct redistributive tax, the investment becomes 
higher, due to a relaxed budget constraint faced by the  -type buyers. The changes in 
investment in the two equilibria, due to a direct tax, indicate a possibility to improve 
social welfare, because the optimal investments with this direct tax move towards the 
social optimal investment level. 
Furthermore, the threshold level of wealth    increases when a direct tax is 
imposed, meaning sellers are more likely to serve both types of buyer, due to the reduced 
wealth gap. Hence the imposition of a wealth redistributive tax could make sellers better 
off in the pooled equilibrium, but worse off in the elitist matching equilibrium.
29
 
 
5.2  Entry Tax 
 
Despite the finding that a direct tax on buyers could improve social welfare, in 
                                                          
29
 We can also show that, given all the constraints being satisfied, the social optimal redistributive tax then 
is                  and both types of buyer will have the same disposable wealth        
         
    Notice that, in this case, the seller’s investment level is   
                    
which is less than the most efficient investment level of the social planner    
               
Because of the seller’s incentive of profit maximizing, the first best outcome cannot be sustained. However, 
the discussion of an optimal tax policy is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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practice it is difficult to implement because the information on individual wealth is hard 
to observe. We now consider a tax on sellers, for example an entry tax or a licence charge 
to sellers. Specifically, let the government charge a one-off tax   on sellers who sell 
houses in the market and transfers   to buyers who decide to purchase a house (    ). 
The problem of the seller now becomes: 
                
   
                            (15) 
                (UC) 
        (BCL) 
        (BCH) 
Then a buyer’s disposable wealth becomes       and the problems of buyers can be 
written as: 
      
  
                        
  
                     (16) 
                 
The balanced budget implies that:  
                     
Solving the equilibrium under such a tax policy, we get the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 6 The entry tax on sellers is welfare neutral. It only increases house 
prices in both equilibria; however, it has no effect on equilibrium investment and 
threshold level of wealth.  
Proof. See Appendix. ■  
 
Imposing a tax on sellers drives the house prices up in both equilibria. In the elitist 
matching equilibrium, the house price is increased by     , and in the pooled matching 
equilibrium by    . The intuition is that, as sellers have local monopoly power, they 
could share some of the tax burden with buyers, given that the price is still in the buyers’ 
budget set. This is possible because the policy is a pure transfer. However, to balance the 
government’s budget, the effective cost of taxation is to be determined by the market 
friction, i.e.    . The parameter of matching friction plays a role in splitting the burden 
of tax between sellers and buyers. If the market friction is relatively low, e.g.   is high, 
sellers pass a smaller proportion of the burden of tax on to buyers. Specifically, in an 
elitist matching equilibrium proportion      of tax is borne by buyers and        is 
shared by sellers. On the other hand, in the pooled matching equilibrium, buyers take 
    while the sellers bear       proportion of the taxation. 
Given the entry tax, the disposable wealth of an  -type buyer in the elitist matching 
equilibrium is           the disposable wealth of an  -type buyer in the pooled 
matching equilibrium is       . Hence, the revenue margin between two equilibria 
still equals to            Yet, given the same level of taxation, when the contacting 
rate is higher, sellers will not raise prices as much as when it is low. Therefore, sellers 
also could benefit from a greater probability to sell houses in this market. In equilibrium, 
the revenue losses from  lower pricing are just offset by a higher contact rate. This 
leaves the expected revenue of a seller unchanged, which contributes to the result of 
welfare neutrality. 
 
5.3  Property Tax 
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Finally, we consider the case that the government charges a proportional tax (  is 
the tax rate) on the house price for each buyer who decides to purchase a house (    ), 
and make a transfer   to each seller as a subsidy. This policy is equivalent to a property 
tax. Under this policy, the buyers’ problems are: 
      
  
                         
  
                     (17) 
                             
whereas the seller’s problem is:  
                   
   
                              (18) 
                    (UC) 
            (BCL) 
            (BCH) 
The balanced budget implies that: 
                       
The effects of property tax on the market equilibria can be summarized as: 
 
Proposition 7 The proportional property tax on buyers has no impact on investment 
level and the threshold level of wealth   , but decreases transaction prices in both 
equilibria.  
Proof. See Appendix. ■   
 
Under the property tax, buyers have to pay extra units    to the government if the 
transaction price is  . Hence, the budget constraint of a consumer is now lower. Given 
that (BCH) or (BCL) binds in equilibrium, it implies that the price that a seller can charge 
is lower. Specifically, the equilibrium price is now only         proportion of the 
previous price. Hence, the tax is effectively shared among buyers and sellers as sellers 
bear         proportion of the taxation and buyers bear the rest. 
Although the property tax leaves sellers with a lower revenue, because part of the 
disposable wealth is taxed by the government, they are subsidized by transfers. The effect 
on the seller’s profit is just offset by the transfer; on average, the amount of the subsidy is 
equal to the seller’s expected loss of revenue caused by taxation. Hence, such a policy 
has no effect on the seller’s profit margin. It implies that the same investment level   
maximizes the seller’s expected profit, as the taxation is a pure transfer. 
Accordingly, as there is no change in the seller’s profit as well as the investment 
decision in the both equilibria, the threshold level of wealth must also be the same. Under 
the property tax, sellers are facing the same trade-off between two equilibria. The policy 
only affects the transaction price and is neutral on social welfare. 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we built a search model to study equilibrium prices and transactions in 
the Chinese housing market. We found out that multiple equilibria arise in the housing 
market depending on the terms of trade. There exist two market equilibria: the elitist 
matching equilibrium and the pooled matching equilibrium. Both equilibria are not 
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socially optimal, from the total social welfare point of view. Our results indicate the 
fast-rising house prices in China are mostly caused by the unequal distribution of 
individual wealth. If high-wealth buyers benefit more from China’s economic growth, 
this will drive the Chinese housing market to an equilibrium where over-investment in 
houses is accompanied by very high house prices. These results can be further supported 
by the recent empirical findings related to China. 
Furthermore, this paper provides an comparative static study on government policies. 
We show that the impact of a redistributive tax among buyers will depend on which 
equilibrium the market is in, yet still having the potential to improve social welfare. An 
entry tax on sellers will increase house prices, and a property tax on buyers will decrease 
house prices; however, both of them will have no impact whatsoever on house investment 
and social welfare. As the equilibrium results are mostly affected by wealth distribution 
across individuals, it is implied that government policies need to take into consideration 
the reduction of this inequality. 
For future research, one interesting area is to extend the study to a long-run search 
model. Allowing buyers and sellers to interact more than once can give a clearer picture 
of the trend of the changing house prices. In addition, allowing free entry of sellers will 
reduce the market power of sellers in determining prices, thus providing an ability to 
further investigate the market structure in the Chinese housing market. 
Appendix 
 
A.1  Proof of Lemma 1 (Second Part) 
 
Proof. In an elitist matching equilibrium, only the  -type buyers are willing to 
trade. Recall the seller’s value function (7) 
      
 
                               (   ) 
                          
                    
Assume that the budget constraint (BCL) holds,            the Kuhn-Tucker 
Lagrangian problem can be written as 
                        
the first order conditions imply that 
  
  
                                                 
  
  
                             
If (BCH) binds, i.e.            then the optimal investment in   is tied down by 
  
            whereas     which requires that 
                  
 
     
  
                            (A.2) 
otherwise (BCH) does not bind; the optimal solution is determined by the first order 
condition (8) by substituting      hence  
       
 
  
  
It is straightforward to see that if (BCH) binds,        , despite the (UC) constraint 
being satisfied, the  -type buyers are excluded from the market, hence the optimal 
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choice of   and   are consistent with the elitist matching equilibrium.30 Following 
similar methods, the choice of a set up cost   and an asking price   consistent with the 
elitist matching equilibrium must be:    that satisfies  
                    if 
       
  or      
                  
   if        
   
Recall the necessary conditions (9) and (A.2) for the budget constraints (BCH) and 
(BCL) bind in the elitist equilibrium and the pooled equilibrium respectively. For these 
two conditions to hold, the equilibrium prices will be    and    respectively, as the 
(UC) constraint also binds. This implies that 
    
       
            
    
As   is concave, the inequality implies that   
     
   hence      
        
   
      
    Therefore, since the matching frictions are sufficiently small (  is large 
enough), the necessary conditions for (BCH) and (BCL) are satisfied, i.e.         
      Hence, when facing the offer    
     , only  -type buyers would choose to 
accept, whilst  -type ones would not, and the volume of trade in the elitist matching 
equilibrium is     When faced with the offer    
     , both types of buyers would 
choose to accept, so the volume of trade in the pooled matching equilibrium is       
 
A.2  Proof of Proposition 2 
 
Proof. Recall the binding budget constraints in each equilibrium,        
  , 
       
  , then:  
  
                  
                           (A.3) 
  is the inverse function of  . Substituting equations (A.3) into the right-hand side of 
equation (12):  
           
  
 
  
 
 
     
  
 
     
  
 
  
 
                   (A.4) 
For any given     and   , we can define                        as a 
function        Because the utility function   is a continuous monotonically 
increasing function, as is  . Therefore,   is a continuous monotonically increasing 
transform from    to itself, i.e.        . Following Brouwer’s Fixed Point 
Theorem, we can conclude that there must exist a threshold level of wealth      such 
that           and    is unique. 
Rearranging equation (12):  
                                                     (A.5) 
Recall the assumption that market frictions are sufficiently low (i.e.   is 
sufficiently high); the inequality             must hold, then we can derive that 
         Hence, the left-hand side of equation (A.5),           , is increasing 
in     and the right-hand side,          , is increasing in     Given       fixed, 
an increase in   does not affect the right-hand side of equation (A.5). However, to make 
the equation hold,    should be reduced. Therefore,     is decreasing in  . 
Similarly, given      fixed, an increase in    increases the right-hand side of 
                                                          
30
 On the other hand, if (BCH) does not bind, where the price is set by          and    is determined 
by the first order condition of (8), which is consistent with elitist matching equilibrium if    is lower than 
   Therefore, we assume that this condition holds. 
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equation (A.5) since       To make the equation hold,    should be increased since 
     . Therefore,    is increasing in        
 
 
A.3  Proof of Proposition 3 (Welfare Consequences) 
 
Proof. The optimization problem can be solved by using Kuhn-Tucker Lagrangian 
method:  
                                         
whereas   is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier, and the resource constraint (RC) is simplified 
by using the fact       The first order condition can be written as 
  
  
                  
  
  
     
  
  
                     
  
  
     
Since an active property market implies that    , the complementary slackness 
conditions requires that                   . Recall the assumption that 
market frictions are sufficiently low (i.e.        , so we can derive that        
             To make sure the equation                   holds, we must 
have    . Therefore                      holds because of the 
complementary slackness, and the social optimal investment is a corner solution 
   
             . It implies that (RC) constraint is binding, and all the disposable 
wealth of the buyers is transferred to the sellers to invest.    
 
A.4  Proof of Proposition 5 (Redistributive Tax) 
 
Proof. For the pooled matching equilibrium, where the buyers’ choice is     
         the expected value functions are, 
  
               
     
  
               
  
 
   
   
where the optimal pricing choice of sellers is           
            Then the 
expected value function of sellers when they choose to serve both types of buyer is  
             
         
  
 
   
                       (A.6) 
   
 
  
    
which implies that the house quality in a pooled matching equilibrium is better.  
For the elitist matching equilibrium, where the buyers’ choice is     
         the value function of the  -type buyers is just             since they 
choose not to buy, while the expected value function of the  -type buyers is, 
  
               
     
where the optimal pricing choice of sellers is   
       
        . Then the expected 
value function of sellers, when they choose to serve the  -type buyers exclusively is  
                   
     
                                 (A.7) 
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which implies that the house quality in an elitist matching equilibrium is worse. By 
combining equations (A.6) and (A.7), the threshold level of wealth is  
              
 
  
   
          
   
   
   
   
  
 
               (A.8) 
Recall that  
    
        
    
 
   
        (A.9) 
    
       
       
Since we have the assumption that    is large enough (             for all     
   ), then we can take the derivative respect to   in the equation (A.7), 
     
   
   
  
  
      
  
   
 
  
 
 
   
  
where        for   
   and   
   Hence, 
  
   
 
   
  
  
 
   
 
  
 
   
   
   
     
  
Similarly, we can show that   
    
        so that 
  
          
   
   
   
    
    
   
Comparing (A.8) to the benchmark model without tax policy, the threshold level of 
wealth is        which tells us that sellers are more likely to serve both types of 
buyers, resulting in a pooled equilibrium.    
 
 
A.5  Proof of Proposition 6 (Entry Tax) 
 
Proof. Now we consider the case that the government charges a lump-sum entry tax 
  on sellers, and transfers   to each buyer who decides to buy a house (    ). The 
cost of building a house becomes        and the buyer’s disposable wealth becomes 
      In the pooled equilibrium, the buyers’ choice is              with both 
types of buyer receiving a transfer   , such that        The expected value functions 
are  
  
        
         
        
  
        
         
        
Following individual rationality, the (UI) constraints implies that the optimal pricing 
choice of sellers is   
       
        
      
     , which implies that   
    
         This proves that under the entry tax scheme, investment in   equals to the 
investment level in a laissez-faire market. This result can also be found through the value 
function of sellers, when they choose the pooled matching equilibrium, which is  
     
      
           
 
 
        
            (A.10) 
which essentially implies the same investment level of    
In the elitist equilibrium, the buyers’ choice is              and only the 
 -type buyer receives a transfer   , such that          The expected value function 
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of an  -type buyers is, 
  
        
         
        
where the optimal pricing choice of sellers is   
       
        
      
  
    . Similarly, in an elitist matching equilibrium, the investment is such that   
    
         which is the same level as in a laissez-faire market  Then the expected value 
function of sellers, when they choose to serve the  -type buyers exclusively is 
   
      
            
 
  
         
              (A.11) 
By combining equations (A.10) and (A.11), the threshold level of wealth is 
   
  
     
  
  
 
  
 
  
As argued above, both   
   and   
   are at the same level in a laissez-faire market, hence 
     . In other words, other than pushing up the transaction price, the entry tax is 
welfare neutral. 
 
A.6  Proof of Proposition 7 (Property Tax) 
 
Proof. In the pooled matching equilibrium where the buyers’ choice is     
         the expected value functions are  
  
        
              
   
  
        
              
   
where the optimal pricing choice of sellers is   
       
                     
   
which means that     
        so that    
         
Furthermore, note that                when        , so that 
  
  
   
    
The expected value function of sellers, when they choose to serve both types of buyer is  
  
     
     
   
   
    
                     (A.12) 
Although, compared with a laissez-faire market, the seller’s revenue is lower under the 
policy, their set up cost is also lower due to subsidies. The losses in the expected revenue 
are just offset by cost reduction, which results in equivalent revenues in a laissez-faire 
market and in one with a property tax. It implies that the same investment level in   
maximizes the seller’s expected profit. 
The same principle applies in the elitist equilibrium, i.e. the buyers’ choice is 
             The expected value function of the  -type buyers is 
  
        
              
   
where the optimal pricing choice of sellers is   
        
                   
  
   which means that     
        so that    
         The budget balance of the 
government tells us that                 and 
  
   
   
    
Then the expected value function of sellers when they choose to serve the  -type buyers 
exclusively is 
   
     
     
  
   
      
                     (A.13) 
As the expected revenue for the sellers is the same as in a laissez-faire market, the 
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investment in   
   is the same under property tax. 
It is straightforward to see that the property tax will not influence the threshold     
as the expected revenues and investments in both equilibria are not changed.    
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Urbanisation, Inequality and Property Prices 
Equilibrium Pricing and Transaction in the Chinese 
Housing Market 
 
Highlights 
 
1. Three striking empirical facts characterises China’s housing 
market. 
2. A search model with endogenous setup cost is solved. 
3. Through urbanization, evolution from pooled- to 
elitist-matching equilibrium drives up property price. 
4. China’s high growth in income and high inequality result in 
elitist-matching equilibrium. 
5. Redistributive tax may decrease housing prices and increase 
social welfare.  
